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Abstract 
  
In this paper we review the linkages between the quality of public finances, that is, the 
level and composition of public expenditure and its financing via revenue and deficits, 
and economic growth. We review the various channels through which public finances 
affect growth and its underlying determinants (institutional framework, employment, 
savings and investment, innovation). The paper addresses the approaches used to assess 
the performance and efficiency of public spending, and surveys the empirical findings on 
the impact of fiscal variables on sustained economic growth.  
 
 
Keywords: quality of public finances, efficiency, growth. 
 























Working Paper Series No. 438
February 2005Non-technical summary 
 
In this paper we review the linkages between the quality of public finances, that is the 
level and composition of public expenditure and its financing via revenue and deficits, 
and economic growth. The importance of high-quality fiscal policies for economic 
growth has been brought to the forefront by a number of developments over the past 
decades. Member States of the European Union are bound to fiscal discipline through the 
Stability and Growth Pact which limits their scope to conduct unfinanced spending. 
Globalisation makes capital and even tax payers more mobile and exerts pressure on 
governments’ revenue base.  
 
The study provides arguments and quantitative evidence that fiscal policies are of high 
quality and support growth if they fulfil the following requirements: (i) provide for an 
institutional environment that is supportive to growth and sound public finances, (ii) limit 
commitments to the essential role of government in providing goods and services, (iii) set 
growth promoting incentives for the private sector and make efficient use of public 
resources, (iv) finance government activities and where appropriate private sector 
activities with an efficient and stable tax system, and (v) support macroeconomic stability 
through stable and sustainable public accounts.  
 
Some of the main conclusions of the paper are as follows:  
 
A well-defined institutional framework is important to support the long-run growth of 
the economy and ‘high quality’ public finances play an important role for its functioning; 
Fiscal policy can contribute to macroeconomic stability and a sound policy mix and 
create expectations that foster economic growth; 
The evidence on size effects of fiscal variables supports the case for quantitative 
consolidation with a view to reducing total spending, thus enabling reductions of deficits 
and taxation. The empirical findings on growth effects of the composition of government 
activities clarify that not all kinds of government spending should be treated alike when 
it comes to reforming public finances; 
5
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February 2005On the spending side, certain core spending items are essential for the economy to 
function and to grow. However, these services also must be delivered in a cost-effective 
way; 
A main growth element is public investment, especially in human capital and – under 
certain conditions - in R&D. The growth effects of physical capital investment are less 
clear-cut;  
Redistributive spending can undermine growth. However, a certain basic level of 
redistribution and social spending is probably necessary as a social infrastructure.  
Taxes should be not distorting and should display low marginal rates while avoiding tax 
uncertainty and time inconsistency; 
The survey of different empirical studies shows that an objective and unambiguous 
overall catalogue of “high quality”-expenditure items is not feasible. There is no 
cookbook for growth. Economics gives an idea of the major ingredients, but it does not 
clearly tell the recipe; 
The quality-indicators for public finances developed in the meantime can only be 
illustrative. Within their methodical limits, indicator-concepts may offer orientation on 
their respective aspects of quality. But no indicator can in fact measure the 
comprehensive quality of public finances; 
In spite of all efforts to identify the sources of growth, we still have a simplistic growth 
concept that ignores many interdependencies and synergies of this process. From this 
perspective, the use of comprehensive case studies could give valuable additional 
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February 20051. Introduction  
 
This study reviews the linkages between the quality of public finances, that is the level 
and composition of public expenditure and its financing via revenue and deficits, and 
economic growth. The importance of high-quality fiscal policies for economic growth has 
been brought to the forefront by a number of developments over the past decades. 
Member States of the European Union are bound to fiscal discipline through the Stability 
and Growth Pact which limits their scope to conduct unfinanced spending. Globalisation 
makes capital and even tax payers more mobile and exerts pressure on governments’ 
revenue base. At the same time, expenditure pressures do not abate, and countries will 
soon have to face up to the fiscal consequences of ageing population.  
 
The study reviews the literature and, thereby, provides arguments and quantitative 
evidence that fiscal policies are of high quality and support growth if they fulfil the 
following requirements: (i) maintain an institutional environment that is supportive to 
growth and sound public finances, (ii) limit commitments to the essential role of 
government in providing goods and services, (iii) set growth promoting incentives for the 
private sector and make efficient use of public resources, (iv) finance government 
activities and (regulate) private sector activities with an efficient and stable tax system, 
and (v) support macroeconomic stability through stable and sustainable public accounts. 
If these conditions are fulfilled, fiscal policies boost growth via positive effects directly 




                                                       
6 It is also worth recalling that there is an important policy debate that discusses the same issue in a 
more operationally minded manner and terminology. The European Commission in its Public Finance 
Report (2004), for example, proposes a broad definition of the quality of public finances, which 
concerns the allocation and the most effective and efficient use of resources in relation to identified 
strategic priorities. This definition does not identify the policy objectives ex ante given that it does not 
single out the expenditure categories that are more “productive” and consequently more quality 
improving. It leaves to the political process the role of setting those priorities which could include 
general social targets, economic growth as well as redistribution and economic stabilization, being 
therefore a technical definition. Additionally, productive expenditure is generically defined as 
expenditure with a positive effect on the growth potential of an economy by means of increasing the 
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February 2005The direct transmission channels to growth are derived from the growth literature 
whereby fiscal policies can affect “exogenous” growth through its effect on labour, 
capital accumulation and technological progress and it can create “endogenous” growth 
effects, for example, when it boosts learning-by-doing effects or contributes to the 
development of a “knowledge-producing” sector.  
 
By contrast, the measurement of public sector efficiency is a difficult empirical issue and 
the literature on it, particularly when it comes to aggregate and international data is rather 
scarce. Recently, progress has been made in this regard by shifting the focus of the 
analysis from the amount of resources used by a ministry or a programme to the services 
delivered or outcomes achieved. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two addresses the various channels through 
which taxes and spending affect growth. Section three assesses public finance quality and 
its growth impact by discussing measurement issues and empirical findings. Section four 
presents the summary and the conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Public finances affect growth 
 
Public finances affect growth in several ways. In the understanding developed here, 
growth is primarily defined as long-term growth potential, and not short term or cyclical 
growth. This section briefly reviews the economic linkages between spending, tax 
policies and growth, as well as the relevance of the institutional framework, and the 
contribution of public finances to macroeconomic stability. There is by now a 
considerable literature of which we provide some general references in the footnote 





                                                       
7 See also European Commission (2001, 2004), ECB (2001), Hemming et al. (2002), OECD (2003a, 
b), Romero de Avíla and Strauch (2003), Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000, 2003), Tanzi and Zee (2000), 
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The institutional framework, that is, the environment within which fiscal policies operate, 
matters for growth via two main channels. First, the existence of a well-defined 
institutional framework is key to growth. Public finances, indirectly, play an important 
role for its proper functioning. Legal constraints and rules, such as well-established 
property rights or the existence of efficient markets minimise institutional uncertainty, 
and enhance the control over and security of returns on investment. Rules promoting 
market exchange (e.g. via contract law, freedom to set prices) are a prerequisite for a 
market economy. Functioning markets generate information via the price mechanism, 
which, in turn, induces agents to work, save, invest, specialise and innovate so as to make 
a profit. Rules must promote competition, secure adequate information and allow 
efficient risk management. They should also guarantee that government actions do not 
undermine but rather support the functioning of markets. In that way a well functioning 
institutional framework minimizes transaction costs for the private economy and helps to 
internalize externalities and spillovers. This view of the role of government has been 
advocated by classical economists such as Adam Smith and advocates of the modern 
institutional and constitutional economics literature (including e.g. F. Hayek, D. North 
and J. Buchanan). 
 
High quality public finances can indirectly support growth by supporting the broader 
institutional framework. With sufficient funds for internal and external security and 
public administration, well-trained and non-corrupt civil servants, judges, etc secure that 
the wheels of the economy are well greased. Underfunded, overstaffed administrations by 
contrast are prone to less well-functioning institutions (see e.g., van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2002)). Prohibitive taxation undermines property rights and subsidised public 
services can destroy private markets.  
 
Second, the institutional framework that governs fiscal policy making plays an important 
role for the quality of public finances and growth via well established and enforceable 
fiscal rules and institutions (see e.g von Hagen, Hallerberg and Strauch (2004)). These 
can prevent an expenditure and deficit bias in the political process that creates inefficient 
  9
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Rules can also secure the stability of fiscal policies by preventing erratic changes in 
deficits, tax laws and expenditure programmes. Furthermore, rules can enhance the 
efficiency of fiscal policies and reduce the scope for rent seeking.  
 
Budgets rules are particularly important because they determine the aggregation of 
spending demands and the solution of distributional conflicts. A number of techniques, 
such as performance budgeting, human resource management tools, market-like 
mechanisms of pricing, have been developed to provide the necessary information for a 
technically sound allocation of resources and enhance the efficiency of the 
implementation process.
8 Other examples of important institutional elements include 
audit rules, public procurement rules and cost-benefit analysis in the context of deciding 
on public activities and regulation as well as expenditure targets or sunset clauses.  
 
2.2. Government spending 
 
In the theoretical literature that links public finances with growth, three expenditure 
variables have been considered: public investment spending, public consumption 
spending and social welfare or redistributive spending. Some of this literature has also 
considered public spending that increases human capital and spending that contributes to 
innovation such as that for research and development as core spending as it enhances the 
human capital base (investment) and technological progress. Total government spending 
average about 45% of GDP in industrialised countries but the range from little over 30% 
of GDP to around 60% suggests enormous differences across countries (European 
Commission, AMECO, as quoted in Tanzi and Schuknecht (2003)). 
 
There is some governmental activity and related public spending that is essential for the 
performance of the economy. This “core”, or “essential”, or “productive” spending may 
be as important to growth as private capital and labour. This core spending can directly 
raise the human and physical capital stock and technical progress in the economy but it 
can also do so indirectly by creating synergies for private activities. Without it the 
                                                       
8 See, for example, OECD (1995). 
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February 2005economy will not function well and will not grow. The level of this spending depends on 
how efficient the government is in using the resources available. The more efficient is the 
government, the lower needs to be the spending level. But government spending depends 
also on a number of “exogenous” factors: geography, the level of development of the 
country and on the sophistication of its markets (Tanzi (2004)).  
 
Core spending includes spending for essential administrative services and justice (see 
also the impact on growth via institutions as discussed above), basic research, basic 
education and health, public infrastructure, internal and external security and so on. 
Spending on these categories in industrialised countries are hard to assess precisely. 
However, if approximated by public consumption they average about 20 percent of GDP 
or 45% of total public expenditure (cfr. European Commission, AMECO database). 
 
Public spending on education (via human capital) and research and development 
(innovation/technical progress) enhances growth. As the new growth theory suggests, 
public activity is needed as it can compensate for market failure due to network-
externalities, non-linearities and monopolistic competition. Public spending (e.g. in the 
areas of education and R&D) can drive education and R&D to a more efficient level than 
would prevail in a pure market scenario. 
 
Redistributive spending by contrast can undermine growth by reducing incentives to 
work, invest in human capital or exercise entrepreneurial talents. Early retirement 
incentives or generous social assistance reduce labour supply and the incentive to 
maintain one’s human capital. On the other hand, spending on basic social safety nets 
reduces the need for precautionary savings and enhances the ability for risk taking and 
insofar could serve as a growth-promoting institutional factor. All in all, an increase in 
efficiently executed core spending can promote growth while an increase in non-core 
spending beyond basic safety nets can be assumed to retard growth. Redistributive 
spending, nevertheless, is the second most or even most significant expenditure category 
in many industrialised countries and averages about 40% of public spending (though this 
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specifically directed to the creation of physical infrastructure. Normally gross fixed 
capital formation is limited to around 2–3% of GDP (or about 5 percent of total spending) 
(see also European Commission (2004)).
9  
  
There is no question that public investment may contribute to growth. Apart from directly 
raising an economy’s capital stock, it is often argued that public investment on 
infrastructure is necessary to crowd in private investment and to reduce some private 
costs. However, in the theoretical as well as the empirical literature the impact is not 
clear-cut (see Pfähler et al. (1996)).  First, the definition of what is an investment is 
somewhat arbitrary and could lend itself to  manipulation.  Second, the use of strictly 
objective cost-benefit analysis has yet to enter investment decisions. Inefficient projects, 
often called “white elephants” can have very significant fiscal costs but with little impact 
on growth. Third, the increase in public investment could replace/discourage private 
investment. Still, in spite of these reservations, it must be maintained that properly 
defined public investment and efficiently executed public projects would contribute to 
growth. 
 
2.3. Tax systems 
 
Industrialised countries typically have well developed revenue collection system to 
finance the above-mentioned spending levels. As revenue must remain on average close 
to spending, the revenue ration also averages nearly 45% industrialised countries with 
roughly one third of this falling on indirect taxes on consumption, six tenths on direct 
taxes on incomes, and the remainder on other revenue.  
 
The level of taxation is important because (a) taxes are generally distortive, and (b) taxes 
transfer resources from the private to the public sector and there is often the presumption 
that the private sector is more efficient in their use. A high level of taxation is likely, 
ceteris paribus, to reduce the growth potential of a country because of the negative impact 
that it might have on work incentives, investment, saving decisions, and on the allocation 
                                                       
9 The remaining 5-10% of total expenditure are interest expenditure on public debt. 
  12
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 438
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reduce growth in that country by inducing capital flight towards lower taxed countries.  
 
While taxes may reduce growth by being too high, they might also reduce it by being too 
low. This will happen if the level of taxation is too low to give the public sector of a 
country the resources necessary to provide essential government services. At least in 
theory, there must be a level and structure of taxation that could be considered “optimal” 
from a growth point of view because it would be just sufficient to finance the essential 
public services in an efficient way. When the tax level of a country exceeds this optimal 
level, a lowering of it could lead to faster growth. For instance, typical examples of tax-
induced distortions are labour-leisure decisions, savings-consumption decisions or the 
alternative allocation of consumption among various commodities and investment among 
various economic sectors. 
 
Over the years, public finance experts have analysed the impact of different taxes and tax 
structure on economic variables, and have generally concluded that not all taxes have the 
same impact on the economy. Taxes that are imposed with high marginal rates (for 
example on the factor labour) are more damaging because economic theory teaches that 
the dead-weight cost of taxes grows with the square of the marginal tax rate. For this 
reason, on efficiency grounds, value added taxes (that are basically proportional taxes on 
consumed income) are preferred by many tax experts to personal income taxes that are 
often applied with high marginal tax rates on both consumption and saving. In general, 
reforms that broaden the base of income taxes and reduce the marginal rates; or that 
replace income taxes with proportional sales taxes improve the efficiency of an economy.  
 
While there are tax changes that improve the efficiency of the economy, it is also true that 
when tax systems are changed frequently in their structural and level aspects, these 
changes introduce “tax uncertainty”, and this could have negative effects on growth. 
Uncertainty makes economic decisions involving the future more difficult. This can 
happen especially when tax uncertainty is likely to create time consistency problems. For 
example a tax reform may introduce tax incentives to stimulate investment but, because 
  13
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removed or reduced after the investments have been made.  
 
In structural terms, taxes and subsidies can serve as one possible tool to internalise 
network-externalities and spillovers in (new growth) models where market price signals 
are not able to lead to a social optimal level of economic activity, e.g. in research and 
development (R&D), development of human capital or production of social and physical 
infrastructure. 
 
2.4. Public finances and macroeconomic stability 
 
Fiscal policies are one factor that can contribute to macroeconomic stability and a sound 
policy mix and, thereby, also support monetary policy in maintaining stable prices at low 
interest rates. Low deficits and debt ratios create expectations that public finances are 
sustainable so that expenditure policies and tax systems and rates will be predictable. 
This is conducive to economic growth because it creates an environment conducive to 
long-term-oriented savings and investment decisions (Sargent (1999)). By contrast, if, 
over a sustained period of time, government revenue is much lower than total public 
spending, (thus, creating unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances and public debt 
accumulation) growth may be reduced because the private sector might come to see the 
fiscal situation as unsustainable and reduces investment in anticipation of future higher 
taxes. Moreover, uncertainty about the future tax changes and, thereby, the tax structure 
may exacerbate the negative effects and, in particular, reduce immobile capital 
investment that is vulnerable to tax increases.
10
 
Moreover, low deficits prevent the absorption of a large share of savings to finance the 
public sector (crowding out) which, in turn, benefits investors via lower interest rates and 
raises the capital stock (see Detken, Gaspar and Winkler (2004)). This argument is based 
on the presumption that Ricardian equivalence (i.e., lower public saving as reflected in 
                                                       
10 For the channels from taxation via deficits and debt to growth see Tanzi and Chalk (2000). For an 
overview of the political economy literature explaining deficit and debt biases see Alesina and Perotti 
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number of arguments and empirical evidence that suggests that at least some crowding 
out of private investment due to public imbalances should be expected (Blanchard (1985), 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Domenech, Taguas and Varela (1999)). 
 
3. Assessing public finance quality and its growth impact  
 
The impact of fiscal policies can be measured in two ways: First, indirectly, by looking at 
the outcome of public spending that might have a bearing on growth and, thereby, 
assessing the productivity and efficiency of the public sector; and second directly via 
statistical/econometric analysis or case studies. 
 
3.1. Measuring the quality of public finances indirectly  
 
3.1.1. Expenditure policies  
 
The adequate measurement of public sector efficiency, particularly when it concerns 
services provision, is a difficult empirical issue and the literature on it, particularly when 
it comes to aggregate and international data is rather scarce (for a survey see Afonso, 
Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003). Recently, academics and international organisations have 
made progress in this regard by shifting the focus of the analysis from the amount of 
resources used by a ministry or a programme (inputs) to the services delivered or 
outcomes achieved (see OECD (2003a)). 
 
There have been a number of attempts to measure public sector performance and 
efficiency by setting output/outcome measures in relation to inputs.
11 Afonso, Schuknecht 
and Tanzi (2003) compute a composite indicator of public sector performance using 
several sub-indicators. One group seeks to measure the functioning of the markets and the 
                                                       
11 See Afonso et al. (2003) for public expenditure performance and efficiency in OECD countries, 
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) for health and education in OECD countries, and Clements (2002) for 
education in Europe. The Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (2004) also provides 
a useful cross-country and cross-sector assessment of the public sector performance while Her 
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education, health and public infrastructure outcomes. They also look at several other 
indicators to incorporate information on the “Musgravian” functions of the government: 
stabilisation, redistribution and allocation. Although such structural indicators can give 
some first indication on the performance, they can only serve as an illustrative tool for 
assessment because the development of composite indicators that show an adequate 
weighting of the different aspects of the performance and sufficient comparability faces 
data and methodological obstacles. 
 
A general pattern that emerges is that countries with lower public spending-to-GDP ratios 
show a better performance of their administration/institutions and more growth while 
large public sectors are correlated with more equal income distribution. Spending on and 
performance of education and health systems seem to be less correlated. Naturally, trying 
to determine the “optimal” composition and size of public spending has to be seen in 
perspective, given the policy options and priorities of each country. 
 
Figure 1 is based on the results presented by the authors for overall public sector 
performance in 1990 and 2000. First, there are marked but not huge difference across 
industrialised countries in 2000. Second, performance seems to have converged between 
1990 and 2000. The chart clearly shows the catching up of Greece, Portugal, Spain and 
Ireland over this decade. However, note that progress in public sector performance made 
by the different countries over time is measured relative to other countries and not 
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February 2005Figure 1 – Index of public sector performance (average=1.0) 






























  Source: Compiled from Afonso (2004) and partially arranged from  
  Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003). 
* Weighted average according to the share of each country GDP.  
 $ Small governments: public spending <40% of GDP.  
   Big governments: public spending  >50% of GDP. 
 
Subsequently, in the aforementioned study public sector performance is set in relation to 
resources used, i.e. public expenditure. Differences in efficiency turned out to be very 
significant and in particular the costs of more equal income distribution in terms of higher 
spending (and taxes) and less favourable economic performance were found to be rather 
high. 
  
The analysis of public sector productivity and efficiency is usually done by applying non-
parametric approaches such as the Free Disposable Hull or the Data Envelopment 
Analysis.
12 With this sort of non-parametric analysis Afonso et al. (2003) show that 
                                                       
12 For instance, Clements (2002) and Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) review efficiency studies using 
non-parametric analysis. In the context of the so-called non-parametric techniques (FDH or DEA), of 
estimating a theoretical efficiency frontier, one assumes that under efficient conditions, for instance, 
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would have used to attain the same performance. Overall, the results of the study also 
seem to indicate declining marginal productivity of public spending. 
 
A study of education and health expenditures by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) further 
illustrates these non-parametric approaches and also sheds some light on the 
shortcomings. The study assesses the efficiency in secondary education and health in 
OECD countries in 2000 by looking at quantity measures of inputs. For education, the 
OECD PISA indicator is the output measure and two quantity measures are used as 
inputs: the number of hours per year spent in school and the number of teachers per 
student.
13 For health, the quantitatively measured inputs are the number of doctors, nurses 
and hospital beds, while the outcomes are infant mortality and life expectancy. 
 
3.1.2. Tax policies 
 
Assessing the quality of public finances, one also needs to look at the way governments 
use taxation to finance their borrowing requirements. Naturally, tax systems play a 
relevant role in determining not only the efficiency of the public sector but also of the 
overall economy.  
 
When evaluating the tax policies of particular countries it is necessary to go beyond 
statutory rates and to develop indicators, which bear a stronger and sounder relation with 
the taxes actually paid, and assess effective taxation. Since there are quite a few elements 
of tax-benefit systems that have to be accounted for when making cross-country 
comparisons, the so-called “effective tax rates” show relative tax burdens resulting from 
                                                                                                                                                              
i y
i x ) ( i i x F y = ) ( i i x F y <
public sector performance of country i, measured by an indicator , the output, which depends on a 
set of factors, , the inputs:  . If  , it is said that country i exhibits inefficiency. 
For the observed input level, the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and inefficiency 
can then be measured by computing the distance to the theoretical efficiency frontier.  
13 Education expenditure is predominantly public particularly in European countries (92.4% of total 
educational expenditure is public in the European Union in 2000). Public expenditure in health is 
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fashion. 
 
Therefore, indicators frequently used in this context are “effective” tax rates and 
“effective” marginal tax rate. For instance, Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) compute 
aggregate effective tax rates on consumption, capital income and labour income for the 
G-7 countries, arguing that these tax rates are the appropriate ones to help transform 
theoretical insights into policy-making. “Effective” marginal tax rates are calculated by 
taking into account statutory tax rates and tax rules defining the taxable basis. They 
represent also by now a well-established approach to analyse the influence of taxes on 
key macroeconomic variables such as saving, investment and employment.  
 
Studies from the European Commission show that the tax burden on labour in the EU has 
been steadily increasing over the last thirty years.
14 The “effective tax rate on labour” in 
the EU, defined as non-wage labour cost (employers’ and employees’ social security 
contributions) and personal labour income tax as a percentage of labour costs, was about 
30% in 1970 and increased to reach a peak of 38% in 1996. These figures compare to a 
tax burden on labour of only 24% in the USA, and some 20% in Japan. Since mid-1990s, 
the EU average tax burden on labour has started to decline in a number of EU countries, 
although only very slightly.  
 
Marginal tax rates are useful indicators in investigating whether Member States face a 
“poverty trap” problem. According to an OECD (2001) study, over the period 1997-2000 
most Member States succeeded in reducing the tax wedge on the low and medium 
earnings (see Table 1, copied from European Commission (2001, pp. 88)). The so-called 
poverty trap is due to the existence (and its rapid withdrawal) of income-tested tax 
allowances and/or a steep progressiveness built into the tax system that leads to 
                                                       
14 See, Commission Issues Paper, ECOFIN of 17 October 2000, EC (2000), and Martinez-Mongay and 
Fernandez (2001). Additionally, Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) also compute average effective tax 
rates for the OECD countries. As a result a joint European Commission-OECD project, Carone et al. 
(2003) also report marginal effective tax rates in the context of the EU.  
  19
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15 With little 
disposable income from additional work effort, labour supply is reduced. 
 
Table 1 – Marginal tax rates in the EU 1997–2000  
(income tax plus employees contributions less cash benefit, as % of gross wage) 
 
 
The measurement of the tax burden and public expenditure is complicated in particular by 
the use of so-called tax expenditure. By “spending” via reducing the taxable base or by 
granting a tax break, they make average taxation and public spending look smaller than 
they would be if “open” expenditure and taxation were used instead. Brixi, Valenduc and 
Swift (2004) provide some results for the “forgone” revenues for some countries which 
can reach up to 4% of GDP.  
 
The EC (2000) shows in simulations that tax distortions would be reduced and growth 
increased by shifting from direct to indirect taxation since consumption taxes are less 
distortionary than labour income taxes. Additionally, a tax shift from labour income to 
indirect taxes is under certain circumstances, a valid alternative to expenditure reduction 
                                                       
15 Tax wedges – the difference between labour costs to the employer and the corresponding net take-
home pay of the employee – express the sum of personal income tax and all social security 
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may also reduce unemployment transfers (see also EC (2000) for further empirical 
references)). 
 
3.1.3. Fiscal institutional framework 
 
Budgetary institutions also play a key role in the quality of public finances. The 
measurement of the quality of fiscal institutions is a difficult task. Some progress has 
been made to measure the quality of institutions to maintain fiscal discipline. The 
relevant literature has identified two commitment technologies to achieve aggregate fiscal 
discipline: the delegation of power to a strong minister of finance and the creation of a 
fiscal contract (see Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2004)). In the delegation 
approach, the minister of finance receives strong agenda setting powers in the planning 
and approval stage, and the necessary discretionary authority to keep the budget on track 
during the implementation stage. In the contract approach, leading policy makers agree 
on the overall budget target before the actual budgeting process starts. During the 
approval and implementation stage, legislative authorities and the minister of finance 
need monitoring tools to ensure that the initial contract is kept. The quality of institutions 
under these approaches has then been assessed via surveys on the relevant parameters.  
 
Empirical work with the resulting measures on the quality of budget institutions have 
shown that the quality of budgetary institutions differs considerably in Europe and 
matters for maintaining fiscal discipline. On average, however, institutions have 
improved over the last decade. Moreover, more stringent multi-annual budgetary targets 
have helped to contain deficits almost across all countries. 
 
3.2. Empirical findings on the growth impact 
 
For a first orientation, the empirical findings on the impacts of fiscal variables on 
sustained economic growth can be divided into two broad groups. The first group studies 
the impact of the most aggregate fiscal variables, like total expenditure, total taxation and 
government debt or deficit. These variables primarily give an impression how govern-
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the growth effects of the composition of government activities. While still on the 
aggregate level, this investigation necessarily takes place one level below the “size 
effects”. The second and relatively small groups looks at case studies and, thereby, 
emphasize more the analysis of the policy process in the broader context that reforms 
take time and concern different policy domains.  
 
3.2.1. Growth effects of government size 
 
Before reviewing the econometric evidence on the growth enhancing (or reducing) 
consequences of general government’s total expenditures, a few stylised facts may give a 
good first impression. For 24 OECD countries, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2003) plot the 
changes in total government spending in the last 40 years of the 20
th century against the 
changes in per capita GDP growth (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 – Change in total spending 1960 –2000 versus  
change in per capita growth, 1960s –1990s 
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Source: AMECO  
 
The illustration of the growth-spending dynamics in the very long run shows a strong 
correlation between total spending increases and growth declines. The same applies for a 
similar plot of gross fixed capital formation (one of the main growth determinants) and 
public spending ratios in the 1990s, i.e. in the medium term. Economy-wide capital 
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These stylised facts lay no claim to statistical significance. Yet, they are supported by 
most econometric studies in this field. Table 2 gives a brief overview of recent papers.
16  
 
Table 2 – Growth effects of total government expenditure 






spending (among others)  
neither positive, 














spending (among others) 
significantly 
negative 
De Gregorio (1996)  21 OECD 
countries 
General government 
spending (among others) 










Heitger (2001)  21 OECD 
countries 
General government 
spending (among others) 
significantly 
negative 
Lee (1995)  16 OECD 
countries 
General government 
spending (among others) 
negative, yet not 
significant  
 
The “size effect” of government spending on growth is mostly negative. No study has 
found a positive relationship between growth and aggregate expenditure. Agell, Lindh 
and Ohlsson (1997) did not find clear evidence on the nature of the relation between the 
two variables. De Gregorio (1996) and Lee (1995) could not confirm the significance of 
the negative spending effects on growth. However, all other studies reviewed assert the 
significance of these effects.  
 
This negative correlation is not a linear function. The review of composition-effects of 
public spending below will show that, at the core level, the productive effects of a certain 
                                                       
16  This and further literature reviews below were compiled with additional reference to surveys of 
empirical research, namely: Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson (1997), Temple (1999), Ahn and Hemmings 
(2000), David, Hall and Toole (2000), European Commission (2002), Florax, de Groot and Heijungs 
(2002), Nijkamp and Poot (2003), Lamo and Strauch, R. (2002), OECD (2003), Tanzi and Schuknecht 
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direct taxes and employment ratios is noteworthy (see also Prescott (2004)).  
Moreover, when looking at the financing side, the strongly negative correlation between level and some components of public expenditure are very high, because government 
activities set the indispensable framework in which economic growth takes place. But the 
evidence in Table 2 gives reason to believe, that the governments in OECD countries 
have outgrown these “purely productive” spending dimensions and now crowd out more 
productive private sector activities.  
 
3.2.2. Growth effects of taxation and the spending composition 
 
Before analysing further the effect of expenditure components on growth, we look at 
taxation. The econometric evidence on the growth effects of the means employed to 
finance the size of government spending supports the argument that a high level of 
taxation impairs the allocation of resources, mainly by depressing incentives to work, to 
invest and/or to save. Moreover, if taxation leads to high und sustained government 
deficits and growing debt, growth is harmed through many channels as discussed above 
(see Tanzi and Chalk (2000)).  
 
For taxation in OECD countries, quite a few studies find significant negative effects on 
growth (see Cashin (1995), de la Fuente (1997), Fölster and Henrekson (1999), and 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998)). Yet other studies cannot find a relationship, be it 
positive of negative. Again, no study so far has shown positive growth effects of high 
taxation. The empirical literature also supports the general view on government deficits. 
Where budget deficits have been tested econometrically, they have often displayed 
significant negative growth effects (see Martin and Fardmanesh (1990), Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993), Miller and Russek (1997), de la Fuente (1997), Kneller et al. (1998) and 
Bleaney et al. (2001)). For aggregate government debt, analogous arguments apply (see 
European Commission (2004)).  
 
The evidence on size effects of fiscal variables supports the case for quantitative 
consolidation with a view to reducing total spending, thus in turn enabling reductions of 
deficits and lower levels of taxation. The review of empirical findings on growth effects 
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spending should be treated alike when consolidating public finances.
17  
 
The evidence on differentiated growth effects of “qualitative” spending aspects crucially 
depends on the quality of the available data. Econometric studies on the macroeconomic 
level often face the necessity to used highly aggregated components of public spending. 
This sometimes leads to empirical endeavours that produce seemingly tautological results 
like: “Specifically we find that (1) distortionary taxation reduces growth, whilst non-
distortionary taxation does not; and (2) productive government expenditure enhances 
growth, whilst non-productive expenditure does not” (Kneller et al. (1998)). When in-
stead looking at the more disaggregated spending level, empirical analyses often must 
resign themselves to the use of intermediate impact indicators which display a plausible 
relation to growth, but do not facilitate direct evidence.  
 
The foremost component of government spending traditionally associated with positive 
growth effects is investment expenditure. Following Aschauer’s (1989) seminal paper 
many studies have found positive growth effects of the acquisition or the accumulation of 
physical capital goods by governments (see for OECD countries, e.g., Cashin (1995), 
Nourzad and Vrieze (1995), Sanchez-Robles (1998), Shioji (2001) and Kamps (2004)). 
Yet, the size of the effects differs considerable. A large number of authors present 
evidence that public investment expenditure has no significant impact on growth (see for 
OECD countries, e.g., Barth and Bradley (1988), Ford and Poret (1991), Holtz-Eakin 
(1994), Yi and Kocherlakota (1996) and Cassou and Lansing (1999)).
18 Moreover, 
investment can be productive or unproductive for growth depending on the institutional 
context in which it is undertaken. Keefer and Knack (2002) show that secure property 
                                                       
17  For brevity’s sake, the evidence on growth effects of different tax regimes cannot be reproduced 
here. By and large, empirical studies reconfirm the theoretical assertions that (1) indirect taxes harm 
growth less than direct taxes and that (2) high tax rates of direct taxes are especially damaging for 
incentives and general allocation.  
18 Vanhoudt, Mathä and Smid (2000) even find evidence for “reverse causality” in the EU-countries. 
Public investment often encompasses more than pure spending on infrastructures. According to their 
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investment. 
 
But there is less polarity in the discussion than it may seem from these contrasting results. 
A certain consensus has emerged that public investment still is important for growth, but 
less important than it used to be (European Commission (2003)). In economic theory, 
public expenditure on physical capital can enhance growth only, if it is spent on 
infrastructures that serve as inputs to private investment. This notion is affirmed by 
empirical evidence, mainly for investments in transport, communication and public 
utilities (see e.g. Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996)).  
 
For infrastructure spending, there is also evidence that the law of diminishing returns 
holds. De la Fuente (1997), for example, has shown that public investment is beneficial 
only up to a level of two percent of GDP. This perspective is endorsed by Kalyvitis and 
Kalaitzidakis (2002) in their case study for Canada: In this “mature” economy equipped 
with a high level of infrastructure, its maintenance promises high productivity effects, 
whereas newly added infrastructure yields low or even negative marginal returns. As a 
conclusion from the mixed empirical findings, Thöne (2004) advocates to dismiss the 
“classical” focus on investment spending in favour of a direct focus on spending for 
infrastructure services.  
 
In contrast, the empirical literature on the significant positive growth effects of public 
activities in the production of human capital is almost unequivocal (see for OECD 
countries, e.g. Englander and Gurney (1994), De Gregorio (1996), Keefer and Knack 
(1997), De la Fuente and Domenech (2000), Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), Gemmell 
and Kneller (2001), Heitger (2001), Buysse (2002) and OECD (2003b)). Due to limited 
data availability, all empirical studies are restricted to formal school education. Thus, the 
human capital effect of vocational training is not reflected in the findings. A second 
restriction directly relates to public finances. Most empirical studies do not use public 
spending on schooling as their independent variable, but school attendance rates, 
schooling years or graduation rates. Wößmann (2002, pp. 58) even states a “missing link 
between expenditure and schooling quality”. This is a good reminder that the focus on 
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efficiency issues.  
 
In modern industrial or “post-industrial” economies, research and development is 
undoubtedly one of the major causes of economic growth. But the growth impacts of 
public R&D-activities are treated controversially in the empirical literature: are public 
and private R&D substitutes, or do they complement one another? Only in the latter case 
public R&D spending can bring about positive effects on economic growth, because it 
does not crowd out private R&D. The studies of Robson (1993), Park (1995), Busom 
(1999), Diamond (1999), Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000) give 
evidence for complementarity, while the studies of Toivanen and Niininen (1998), 
Wallsten (1999), Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001) indicate crowding out. As 
only a slight majority of econometric research supports the notion of complementarity, 
the empirical question should be treated as unsolved.
19  
 
Health policy has long been counted among the growth-enhancing government activities, 
because good health improves human capital and thereby growth. Bleaney, Kneller and 
Gemmell (2001) find a significant positive impact of health expenditures on growth in 
OECD countries. Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001) support this view in a worldwide 
study. Yet with respect to the OECD, Rivera and Currais (1999) see evidence for reverse 
causality: economic growth has created high real incomes which enable people to spend 
more on the consumption good ‘health’.  
 
There are also other policies that may help to mobilise human capital. In many countries 
women still have insufficient chances and incentives to combine family life with a long-
term professional career. The ensuing low labour utilisation is an important obstacle to 
satisfactory growth dynamics. As far as government expenditure is concerned, 
particularly early childcare measures significantly increase female labour market 
participation. This is supported the empirical evidence on the high negative elasticity of 
female labour supply with respect the individual costs of out-of-home childcare (see e.g. 
                                                       
19 David, Hall, and Toole (2000) survey 30 empirical studies and come to a comparable conclusion.  
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3.2.3. Institutional linkages 
 
Finally, we should look at the transmission from fiscal policies to growth via the 
institutional framework. There is little modern empirical literature on this issue so far but 
important work has looked at this dimension from a case study perspective (see also 
below for the use of case studies to discuss the impact of broader fiscal and institutional 
reform programs).  
 
North (1990, 1998) provides fascinating accounts of how fiscal policies, institutions and 
growth interact. North explores how England and Spain from similar starting points went 
very different ways in their economic development. Both countries needed more money 
to finance their wars. In England, decentralized decision making with independent courts, 
secure property rights and a well developed mercantile law including patent law gave rise 
to a law-based market economy, with much investment and innovation and rapidly 
developing capital markets. This also filled the government’s coffers via moderate 
taxation. In Spain by contrast, the government stifled economic exchanges/trade with 
over-regulation, the sale of monopoly rights and price controls. Over-taxation and 
confiscation undermined property rights. The two basic rules supporting investment, 
innovation and growth could hence not develop. Fiscal revenue, though perhaps initially 
buoyant, suffered. 
 
3.2.4. Making use of the evidence 
 
How do we interpret the evidence on the growth impact of diverse fiscal instruments and 
objectives? An ideal econometric study on the growth impact of fiscal variables might 
come to a conclusion like: “For our panel of 20 OECD countries, an x percent increase of 
                                                       
20 The empirical literature mentioned above refers to the United States. Recently, the OECD has 
started a series of country studies, which now covers the relationship of “Babies and Bosses” in 
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z percent on average.” Of course, this is not a cookbook recipe for future growth. One of 
those OECD countries now increasing spending on the “y-item” by “x percent” would 
almost certainly not experience an increase of growth rates by “z percent”.  
 
It goes without saying that, by its very nature, econometric analysis can give ex post 
evidence on “average” impacts only. Furthermore, the analysis of rather recent 
developments in OECD or EU countries cannot make allowances for non-linearities that 
especially become evident for core spending (protection of property rights, internal and 
external security).  
 
Finally, the econometric foundation of the new growth literature itself is subject to 
controversial debate. When interpreting the evidence with a view to the quality of public 
finance, we should bear in mind that, despite its popularity, the “(…) new empirical 
growth literature remains in its infancy” (Durlauf and Quah (1999, pp. 295)). So far, in 
standard growth regressions a range of methodological problems are not sufficiently 
controlled for. On an elementary level, many of the empirical studies on the sources of 
growth are plagued with measurement error and specification problems (Schulz (1999, 
pp. 71)). Many variables of growth are endogenous, which raises identification problems. 
Endogeneity, if not properly dealt with, can easily give rise to the notorious post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy, i.e. wrongly concluding causality from correlation. Yet, the obvious 
answer to simultaneity – using exogenous instrumental variables to proxy for the 
regressors – requires very strong, in many cases implausible assumptions for the omitted 
growth determinants (Durlauf (2000, pp. 252)). The multiplicity of proposed variables 
which offer plausible partial explanations of growth also calls for procedures of variable 
selection, or, at least, for tests of robustness (see e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-
i-Martin (1997)).  
 
These and other problems of the empirical growth literature demonstrate that the above 
mentioned ideal econometric study on the growth impact of fiscal variables does not 
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21 Nevertheless, there is no need to discard the empirical evidence surveyed in this 
paper. Growth regressions may not always live up to the very high expectations they once 
raised. But still they give a good idea of the driving forces of growth. Some of the 
methodological problems mentioned can be overcome with the use of modern statistical 
methods.  
 
Other problems of growth econometrics cannot be overcome because they do not reflect 
statistical or mathematical complications, but our limited understanding of the mechanics 
of growth. In spite of the major efforts to identify the sources of growth, we still have a 
simplistic growth concept that ignores many interdependencies and synergies of this 
process. From this perspective, “greater eclecticism in empirical work” with a stronger 
reliance on qualitative case/country studies promises valuable additional insight (see 
Durlauf (2000)). Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), for example, examine the fiscal reform in 
a number of countries in the 1980s and 1990s. They argue that comprehensive (“radical”) 
rather than piecemeal reforms, which improve the institutional framework and curb the 
rent seeking incentives of special interests, have been most successful in reducing public 
expenditure, changing the expectations and outlook of economic actors and re-
invigorating economic growth. They provide a detailed account for the experiences of 
New Zealand and Chile but also make reference to the reforms in OECD countries such 
as Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands or the UK.  
 
The interdependencies and synergies of all-in-one reforms give a good illustration why 
the same partial policies may lead to different growth results in different countries. Of 
course, institutional and political preconditions for radical reform are not alike in all 
countries. But be it comprehensive reforms, be it piecemeal reforms, a few issues stand 
out despite all methodological complicacies: it is certainly wise to treat policies that are 
positively associated with current economic growth differently than other policies which 
are not. And the returns for these “wisely spent” expenditures do not necessarily come 
tomorrow, but in the medium and – mainly – in the long-term.  
 
                                                       
21 E.g. model specification and heterogeneity. For further discussion see Pack (1994), Freedman 
(1997), and Brock and Durlauf (2001). 
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The present survey has addressed the fact that the “quality of public finances” indeed 
might have a potential impact on long-term economic growth. One key problem in the 
whole debate, however, is that the issue of “quality” is very difficult to capture. 
Moreover, theoretical limitations (economic theory, econometric studies) and data and 
methodological problems (construction of indicators) prevent exact quantifications 
handoff the impact of fiscal policies on growth.  Some concluding points can now be 
summarised building on the previous sections. 
 
-  A well-defined institutional framework is important to support the long-run growth 
of the economy and ‘high quality’ public finances play an important role for its 
functioning; 
-  Fiscal policy can contribute to macroeconomic stability and a sound policy mix and 
create expectations that foster economic growth; 
-  The evidence on size effects of fiscal variables supports the case for quantitative 
consolidation with a view to reducing total spending, thus enabling reductions of 
deficits and taxation. The empirical findings on growth effects of the composition of 
government activities clarify that not all kinds of government spending should be 
treated alike when it comes to reforming public finances; 
-  On the spending side, certain core spending items are essential for the economy to 
function and to grow. However, these services also must be delivered in a cost-
effective way; 
-  A main growth element is public investment, especially in human capital and – under 
certain conditions - in R&D. The growth effects of physical capital investment are 
less clear-cut;  
-  Redistributive spending can undermine growth. However, a certain basic level of 
redistribution and social spending is probably necessary as a social infrastructure.  
-  Taxes should be not distorting and should display low marginal rates while avoiding 
tax uncertainty and time inconsistency; 
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overall catalogue of “high quality”-expenditure items is not feasible. There is no 
cookbook for growth. Economics gives an idea of the major ingredients, but it does 
not clearly tell the recipe; 
-  The quality-indicators for public finances developed in the meantime can only be 
illustrative. Within their methodical limits, indicator-concepts may offer orientation 
on their respective aspects of quality. But no indicator can in fact measure the 
comprehensive quality of public finances; 
-  In spite of all efforts to identify the sources of growth, we still have a simplistic 
growth concept that ignores many interdependencies and synergies of this process. 
From this perspective, the use of comprehensive case studies could give valuable 
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Exogenous growth models first appeared in the 1950s, pioneered by Solow (1956) and 
Swan (1956). Set within the neo-classical framework, these models include a production 
function and a capital accumulation equation. The production function in its simpler 
version has two inputs, capital and labour, exhibit constant returns to scale in production 
and diminishing marginal productivity of both inputs. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, it the production function can be written as follows 
 




where Y is output, K is capital, L is the labour force, 0<α< 1. An alternative way of 
expressing the production function is:  y = k
α, where k=K/L and y=Y/L are capital and 
output per unit of labour. 
 
Capital accumulation obeys the following process:  
 
  Kt = sY-δKt-1, (A2) 
 
where s is the aggregate saving rate and δ the depreciation rate of capital, both constant 
and exogenous.  
 
These models emphasise the role of physical capital accumulation as the cause of growth, 
but due to their feature of decreasing returns to capital, the growth process is non-
sustainable. For fixed labour, each additional unit of capital gives a lower return than the 
previous one, and gradually the economy moves to a point where savings provide 
investment only to cover depreciation.  
 
Sustainable growth requires “technological progress” which augments capital (and 
labour) productivity. An index of technical efficiency, A, which captures technical 
progress, is then introduced in the production function: 
 




With such a production function specification, economies exhibit a long-run per-capita 
growth rate at the rate of technological change.  
 
Technological change is not explained within the model, but taken as exogenous, and the 
model does not explain the determinants of long-term growth. According to the 
exogenous growth models policy changes only have impact on determining the level of 
output, they do not affect long-run growth rates, and they can raise the output growth but 
only during a transition period to a new steady state level of output. 
 
 
                                                       
22 Adapted from Lamo and Strauch (2001). 
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and Lucas (1988), account for the introduction of endogenous mechanisms of 
technological change. These models constitute a useful framework to study the effects of 
fiscal policy on long-term growth. They allow sustained growth and policy changes have 
effects not only on the level of output but also on the growth rates. Perpetual growth of 
output is possible as capital has externality effects and or is defined in a broader way, i.e. 
diminishing returns do not apply. Accordingly, growth can permanently be raised by 
increasing aggregate savings, by inputs accumulation (labour, human and physical 
capital), by higher efficiency in the production process and by supporting technological 
progress and research and development (R&D) investment. 
 
A basic framework is to assume that the capital is the only input in the production 
function and that output varies proportionally with capital, i.e. the production function 
exhibits constant returns to capital instead of diminishing. In this setting, as long as net 
investment is positive, output grows. This model is known as the AK model because of 
its production function is written as Y=AK.  
 
Another approach is to define capital broadly including human capital (skills and 
knowledge in the labour force). There may be two investment processes in the model, 
investment in physical capital and in human capital with a production function which has 
constant returns to both capitals jointly. 
 
An alternative way to reach sustained growth and to give a role to policies consists in 
introducing a knowledge–producing sector. Additionally, Romer (1990) formalises the 
relationship between ideas and growth. Technology progress is endogenous via the 
introduction of the search for new ideas, and technology then is driven by R&D. For a 
given level of technology the production function has constant returns to scale, and 
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